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Abstract
When people predict their future behavior, they tend to place too much weight on their current intentions, which
produces an optimistic bias for behaviors associated with currently strong intentions. More realistic self-predictions require
greater sensitivity to situational barriers, such as obstacles or competing demands, that may interfere with the translation
of current intentions into future behavior. We consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for such
barriers. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current intentions, ignoring potential barriers altogether. We
test this possibility, in three studies, with manipulations that draw greater attention to barriers. Second, barriers may be
discounted in the self-prediction process. We test this possibility by comparing prospective and retrospective ratings of
the impact of barriers on the target behavior. Neither possibility was supported in these tests, or in a further test examining
whether an optimally weighted statistical model could improve on the accuracy of self-predictions by placing greater
weight on anticipated situational barriers. Instead, the evidence supports a third possibility: Even when they acknowledge
that situational factors can affect the likelihood of carrying out an intended behavior, people do not adequately moderate
the weight placed on their current intentions when predicting their future behavior.
Keywords: self-prediction, intention, optimistic bias.
1 Introduction
The present research examines people’s attempts to pre-
dict whether they will engage in desired future behaviors.
Imagine, for example, that your spouse or roommate has
asked whether you will be able to paint the living room
before house guests arrive next month. Although you
are committed to the project and intend to tackle it soon,
you realize that, despite your best intentions, you may en-
counter situational “barriers” that prevent you from getting
the job done. So how do you answer the question? What is
the likelihood that you will actually complete the project?
The present research examines how people arrive at self-
predictions in contexts such as this, and specifically how
they balance current intentions to perform a behavior with
potential barriers to completion of the behavior.
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1.1 Optimistic self predictions
People often try to predict their own future actions and
outcomes, and these self-predictions can have widespread
personal and social consequences. Given that many im-
portant choices and decisions are based on people’s be-
liefs about what they will do in the future, errors in self
prediction can be costly. For example, if people overes-
timate their future accomplishments, this could result in
disappointment, broken promises, and decisions that are
later regretted. Nevertheless, despite the potential benefits
of accurate self-prediction, a wealth of research indicates
that people’s predictions about their future behavior and
outcomes are often inaccurate and, in many cases, tend
to be overly optimistic (for reviews see Armor & Taylor,
1998; Dunning, 2007). Individuals hoping to finish a fu-
ture task promptly underestimate the time it will require
(Buehler, Griffin, & Peetz, 2010) and those seeking to
improve their personal finances underestimate their future
spending (Peetz & Buehler, 2009) and overestimate future
savings (Koehler, White, & John, 2011). People also over-
estimate the likelihood that they will have long and happy
relationships (MacDonald & Ross, 1999), land high pay-
ing jobs (Hoch, 1985), perform well on tests and exams
(Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; Shepperd, Ouellette, &
Fernadez., 1996; Helzer & Dunning, 2012), give gener-
ously to charity (Epley & Dunning, 2000), donate blood
(Koehler & Poon, 2006; Tanner & Carlson, 2009), vote in
upcoming elections (Epley & Dunning, 2006), and engage
in healthy behaviors (Lipkus & Shepperd, 2009). In short,
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people tend to believe that they are more likely to engage
in personally desirable, or intended, future behaviors than
is actually the case.
Researchers have identified a number of cognitive and
motivational processes that can give rise to overly opti-
mistic self-predictions. People may form optimistic pre-
dictions, in part, because they adopt an “inside approach”
where they focus on constructing a mental model of the
specific target event, such as an imagined scenario of the
event unfolding, rather than an “outside approach” where
they base predictions on a set of relevant past experiences
(Buehler et al., 2010; Dunning, 2007; Epley & Dunning,
2000; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). The problem with
the inside approach is that mental representations of fu-
ture events tend to be idealized, schematic, and oversim-
plified (Dunning, 2007), and do not account for the myriad
alternative ways in which an event could unfold (Hoch,
1985; Griffin, Dunning, & Ross, 1990; Newby-Clark et
al., 2000). Optimistic predictions may also reflect pro-
cesses of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) or desirabil-
ity bias (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) wherein people fo-
cus selectively on information that supports a particular,
preferred conclusion. As a consequence, self-predictions
may be unduly influenced by personal goals and aspira-
tions salient at the time of prediction (e.g., Buehler, Grif-
fin, & MacDonald, 1997; Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Peetz
& Buehler, 2009).
1.2 The role of current intentions
A theoretical framework developed by Koehler and Poon
(2006) complements and extends the previous accounts by
focusing on the role of intention in self prediction. This
framework is especially pertinent to predictions concern-
ing behaviors that people are committed to performing and
that are largely under their personal control — such as the
living-room painting project in the opening example. This
framework has practical value because it specifies when
people will be most prone to making overly optimistic
self-predictions, and suggests strategies for avoiding this
bias.
According to Koehler and Poon (2006), when assessing
how likely they are to carry out some future behavior, peo-
ple start with, and consequently overweight, the strength
of their current intentions to carry out the target behavior.
Of course intention strength — that is, the extent to which
the individual feels committed to carrying out the target
behavior — can be a useful cue in predicting the likeli-
hood of future behavior. Extensive research based on the
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Mad-
den, 1986) has shown that, generally, the stronger one’s
current intention to perform a behavior the more likely it
is that the behavior will be carried out in the future. How-
ever, this research also indicates that the predictive valid-
ity of current intentions is far from perfect; a substantial
amount of variance in behavior remains unexplained by
intentions (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Rhodes & Dickau,
2012; Sutton, 1998; Webb & Sheeran, 2006).
Several factors may limit the predictive validity of peo-
ple’s current intentions. For one thing, the strength of peo-
ple’s intentions may change after generating their predic-
tions, and to the extent that intention strength is not sta-
ble across time it cannot be a valid predictor (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1974; Sutton, 1998). In addition there are many
external, situational, or contextual factors that are largely
unrelated to the strength of intentions, but could greatly
influence the likelihood of completing the target activity.
Koehler and Poon (2006) describe such factors as influenc-
ing the “translatability” of intentions into action. Some of
these factors facilitate the intended behavior, falling into
a category that Lewin (1951) described as “channel fac-
tors” (Ross & Nisbett, 1991), a classic example being the
provision of a map to students following a persuasive ap-
peal to participate in a tetanus inoculation program (Lev-
enthal, Singer & Jones, 1965). Other factors present bar-
riers to completion of the behavior, such as task difficulty,
lack of necessary resources, interruptions, and competing
demands for one’s time. To the extent that such factors
are operating, people’s intentions at the time of prediction
may be only a weak determinant of their subsequent be-
havior.
According to Koehler and Poon (2006), because an
evaluation of current intention serves as a natural start-
ing point in the self-prediction process, people’s self-
predictions typically overweight intention strength and un-
derweight factors that influence the ease with which in-
tentions are translated into action. Using the terminol-
ogy of Kahneman and Frederick (2002), people use cur-
rent intention strength as a readily available, easily evalu-
ated “heuristic attribute” in forming self-predictions. This
heuristic attribute tends to be substituted for the more diffi-
cult judgment of the “target attribute”, that is the probabil-
ity of the target behavior. Adjustments may then be made
in light of additional factors that influence behavior to the
extent that they are recognized as relevant, but such ad-
justments are likely to be insufficient. As a result, current
intention strength will be overweighted relative to its im-
pact on the future behavior being predicted, and predictive
factors unrelated to current intention strength will be un-
derweighted. Another implication of this account is that,
when — as is typically the case — current intentions have
only moderate predictive validity, self-predictions based
on strong intentions will typically be too optimistic.
Consistent with this theorizing, a set of studies by
Koehler and Poon (2006) demonstrated that people’s pre-
dictions of the likelihood that they will engage in a be-
havior (donating blood, participating in a future experi-
ment) corresponded very closely to their ratings of inten-
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tion strength at the time of prediction, but the actual prob-
ability of the target behavior did not increase with inten-
tion strength to the extent implied by self-predictions. Fur-
thermore, manipulations that increased intention strength
had a larger impact on self-prediction than on the actual
behavior, whereas manipulations designed to increase the
ease with which intentions are translated into behavior
had a larger impact on actual behavior than on prediction.
For example, in one experiment participants estimated the
probability they would participate in a future web-based
survey to help out a student research project. A subset
of participants told that their participation was crucial to
the student’s ability to complete the project (vs. merely
helpful) reported stronger intentions to participate and pre-
dicted that it was more likely they would do so; however
this manipulation had relatively little impact on actual par-
ticipation rates. In contrast, providing participants with a
reminder to participate in the experiment just before it be-
gan had little effect on their estimates of the likelihood
they would participate, but a substantial effect on their ac-
tual behavior.
1.3 Consideration of barriers to intended
action
The main objective of the present research was to examine
how potential barriers to intended action are, or are not,
considered when people make self-predictions. Consider-
ation of such barriers is important because, no matter how
strongly a person intends to carry out an intended behav-
ior, there is always the possibility of encountering circum-
stances that prevent completion of the behavior. The ob-
servation from previous research that self-predictions tend
to be overly optimistic for behaviors that people strongly
intend to carry out suggests that, for one reason or another,
such barriers may not be given sufficient weight in the self-
prediction process.
We focus on two broad types of barriers to intended ac-
tion: obstacles and competing demands. While partici-
pants were left to their own interpretations, the distinction
we had in mind was that obstacles are inherently part of the
process of completing the target behavior, while compet-
ing demands from other activities are external to the target
activity but nonetheless influence the likelihood of com-
pleting it. For instance, if the target behavior is painting
the living room next weekend, running out of paint or hav-
ing to wait longer than expected for the first coat to dry be-
fore applying the second would be examples of obstacles,
while having to spend much of the weekend completing a
tax return or attending a family event would be examples
of competing demands. We characterize such barriers (ob-
stacles and competing demands) as factors that complicate
the relation between current intentions and later behavior.
1.4 The present research and hypotheses
Making self-predictions accurately requires appropriate
adjustment for potential barriers. In the present research,
we evaluate three hypotheses regarding ways in which
potential barriers to intended behavior may fail to ex-
ert adequate influence on self-predictions. The first two
hypotheses concern inadequate direct adjustment of self-
predictions for anticipated barriers, due either to neglect or
discounting of their potential impact. The third hypothesis
concerns indirect adjustment to self-predictions, in which
the weight placed on current intentions is not sufficiently
adjusted for the ways in which various situational factors
(including potential barriers) can weaken the relation be-
tween current intentions and later behavior.
H1: Inattention to potential barriers. Self-predictions
may tend to focus exclusively on current intentions, ignor-
ing the potential impact of barriers to completing the in-
tended behavior. That is, people may be able to accurately
anticipate potential barriers when asked to do so prospec-
tively, but may not spontaneously consider them in mak-
ing self-predictions, which might for instance instead rely
exclusively on current intentions. We test this possibility
in the reported research with experimental manipulations
designed to draw greater attention to potential barriers be-
fore self-predictions are elicited. If inattention to potential
barriers is playing a role, such manipulations would be
expected to increase the weight placed on prospective bar-
riers and hence decrease self-predictions (and associated
optimistic bias) of target behavior completion.
H2: Discounting of potential barriers. Alternatively,
potential barriers may be considered as part of the self-
prediction process but their anticipated impact could be
underestimated or discounted, for instance through mech-
anisms of motivated reasoning. We test this possibility di-
rectly in Study 2 by comparing prospective — and hence
potentially discounted — ratings of potential barriers with
retrospective — and hence potentially more realistic —
ratings collected after the opportunity to complete the tar-
get behavior had passed.
Another way we test H1 and H2, jointly, is through the
construction of statistical prediction models that place op-
timal weight on ratings of potential barriers in predicting
the probability of the target behavior being successfully
completed. Under either H1 or H2, such models — be-
cause they correct for inattention to or discounting of po-
tential barriers — would be expected to outperform intu-
itive self-predictions in predicting the probability of the
target behavior.
H3: Overweighting of current intentions. Finally,
self-predictions may place too much weight on current
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intentions despite the inherent unpredictability reflected
in the typically modest correlation between current inten-
tions and later behavior. As in Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1973) seminal work on the psychology of intuitive pre-
diction, self-predictions may be based on an evaluation of
current intention strength without regard to its validity as
a predictive cue (what Kahneman and Tversky referred to
as “prediction by evaluation”). Such a process could yield
overly optimistic self-predictions in the presence of strong
intentions even when potential barriers are not ignored or
discounted in direct evaluations (e.g., even when the in-
dividual acknowledges, upon being asked explicitly about
such barriers, that they could have some impact). In that
case, we should continue to see systematic overweighting
of current intentions that is not influenced, for instance,
by manipulations drawing attention to potential barriers,
even when such manipulations are shown to increase — in
direct ratings — their anticipated impact.
To date, very few studies have directly tested H3 by
comparing predicted and actual changes in the likelihood
of future behavior as a function of intention strength as
rated at the time of prediction. The first direct evidence
came from a study (Koehler & Poon 2006, Study 1) com-
paring university students’ self-predicted and actual rates
of blood donation at an on-campus clinic. Self-predictions
were obtained approximately two weeks in advance of
the clinic, and the overall rate of actual blood donation
in the sample (20%) was quite low. Results consistent
with overweighting of current intentions were also re-
ported by Koehler, White, and John (2011, Experiment 1)
in a study of university students’ savings goals, although
these researchers did not directly compare regressions of
self-predictions and actual behaviors on intention strength.
We sought to broaden the evidence pertaining to over-
weighting of intentions in self-predictions by examining
a wider variety of target behaviors, and by studying self-
predictions elicited from a more demographically diverse
set of participants, than has been done in previous studies.
2 Studies 1 and 2
Study 1 concerned household and gardening projects, and
involved shoppers who were leaving a hardware store with
the necessary supplies. Participants were asked to esti-
mate the probability that they would complete the project
within 30 days, and also evaluated the strength of their cur-
rent intentions to do so. Some participants were asked to
consider potential obstacles to completion of the project,
and competing demands from other activities, before mak-
ing their self-predictions. Our main question was whether
drawing attention to these potential barriers, compared to a
condition in which self-predictions and intention strength
ratings were made before the request to consider them,
would affect the self-predicted probability of completing
the project within the next 30 days.
In contrast to Study 1, in which participants had already
taken a first step toward completing the target project (by
going to the hardware store to purchase supplies), in Study
2 we asked telephone-survey respondents to identify a
project or activity they wished to carry out within the next
three months but had not yet taken any concrete steps to-
ward completing. By extending the forecast horizon from
30 days to 3 months, and focusing on projects that had not
yet been started, we thought there would be more room
than in Study 1 for variance in both self-predictions and
actual outcomes, and in perceptions of potential barriers as
well. Study 2 also broadened our investigation by looking
not just at household projects (such as those investigated
in Study 1), which for many people represent an unpleas-
ant obligation rather than an enjoyable pastime, but also
at leisure activities such as taking a weekend getaway. It
is possible that the tendency to overweight current inten-
tions when making self-predictions is limited to the case
of obligations, that is, tasks people feel they should com-
plete even though they do not necessarily want to do. A
third goal of the study was to investigate the role of de-
mographic variables, specifically sex and age, as they re-
late to self-predictions, intentions, and target activity com-
pletion. One question of particular interest was whether,
compared to younger people, older people are less prone to
overweight current intentions when predicting their future
behavior. One might expect such a result if older people
have accumulated more experience, or developed greater
self-insight, in recognizing that later behavior does not al-
ways coincide with initial intentions.
2.1 Method
In these studies, we report all data exclusions, all manip-
ulations, and all measures. Sample sizes were determined
in advance, based informally on our intuitive estimates of
likely response and attrition rates.
2.1.1 Participants
Study 1 took place at a large hardware and building supply
store, which was part of a national chain. Shoppers were
approached by a female experimenter as they exited.1 the
store, and were asked if they were making purchases for
“a home or gardening project that you will be working on
in the next month.” Those who answered yes were invited
to participate in the study, in appreciation for which they
would be entered in a draw to win a $100 gift certificate
1A small number of participants (n = 6) were approached as they
entered rather than as they exited the store, and for another small number
(n = 5) the location at which they were approached was not recorded; the
remaining large majority of participants (n = 200) were approached as
they exited.
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to a local restaurant. The entire interview was conducted
orally, with responses recorded in writing by the experi-
menter. Of the 211 participants for whom we had initial
self-predictions, 192 (91%) consented to be contacted for
the follow-up interview (by phone or email). Of the 192
participants who consented to being re-contacted, we were
able to obtain follow-up (outcome) data from 130 (68%).
Participants for whom we were able to collect outcome
data did not differ from those for whom we were not in
their responses to any of the questions posed in the initial
survey (self-predictions, intentions, obstacles, competing
demands, etc.).
Participants in Study 2 were adult residents of Waterloo
Region, Ontario, Canada. We used a random sampling
procedure to select a total of 908 names and addresses
from the residential section of the local telephone direc-
tory. An information letter was then sent to each of the se-
lected households describing the purpose and nature of the
study. To encourage participation, potential participants
were told that all survey respondents would be entered in a
draw for several $50 gift certificates. Approximately one
week after mailing the information letter, we conducted
the initial telephone interview. From the potential sample
of 908 households, we were able to contact 649 adult res-
idents of whom 314 (48%) agreed to participate. Of the
314 participants who completed the initial telephone sur-
vey, 266 (85%; 160 females, 106 males) also completed
the follow-up survey. Respondents from the initial sur-
vey who did and did not complete the follow-up interview
did not differ significantly with respect to any of the ac-
tivity ratings from the initial survey (self-predictions, in-
tentions, obstacles, competing demands, etc.). In terms of
age, the final sample included participants in their teens
(n=10), 20s (n=43), 30s (n=61), 40s (n=66), 50s (n=46),
60s (n=15), 70s (n=14), and older (n=4), as well as 7 par-
ticipants who did not report their age.
2.1.2 Project or activity nomination
In Study 1, participants were asked to name or briefly de-
scribe the project for which they were shopping, and then
were asked a number of questions regarding that project.2
In Study 2, the interviewer asked participants to identify
a specific project or activity that they were hoping to com-
plete within the next three months. We varied the type of
target activity by randomly assigning participants to iden-
tify either a household project (e.g., a repair or renovation,
a change in the interior design or furnishing of their home,
2An initial item asked participants to rate the importance of their
project relative to other activities that were, by random assignment, of
either low or high importance. This manipulation influenced ratings of
project importance, as intended, but had no effects on any other variables;
further, the importance ratings were not significantly correlated with in-
tention strength, self-prediction, or the barrier ratings. As such it is not
discussed further here.
a major cleaning or organization project, or a lawn or gar-
dening project) or a leisure activity (e.g., attending an arts
or cultural event, travel such as a get-away weekend, or
some kind of sporting or recreational activity). Partici-
pants were further instructed that the target activity should
not be something that was already started or scheduled, or
something that was part of their regular routine.
2.1.3 Measures
Self-prediction: Participants were asked [in Study
1/Study 2], “How likely do you think it is that you will ac-
tually complete this [project/activity] within the next [30
days/3 months]? Please give your estimate as a proba-
bility between 0%, meaning that you are certain you will
NOT actually do so within the next [30 days/3 months],
and 100%, meaning that you are certain that you WILL
actually do so within the next [30 days/3 months].” Partici-
pants were encouraged to give ratings rounded to the near-
est 10%, which is the form in which they were recorded
by the experimenter.3
Current intention strength: Participants in Study 1
were asked, “On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means
“strongly disagree” and 10 means “strongly agree,” to
what extent do you agree with the following statement?
Right now, as I think about it, I very strongly intend to
complete this [project/activity] within the next 30 days.”
Participants in Study 2 were asked the same question, ex-
cept the statement was read to them before the instructions
regarding the response scale.
Obstacles: Participants were asked to rate their agree-
ment, using the same scale as the intention strength item,
with the statement, “As much as I might intend to complete
this [project/activity], there are likely to be difficulties or
obstacles that arise in carrying out the [project/activity] it-
self that could prevent me from actually doing so over the
next [30 days/few months].”
Competing demands: Participants were asked to rate
their agreement, on the same scale used for the two items
above, with the statement, “As much as I might intend
to complete this [project/activity], there are likely to be
other things in my life that compete for my time or
could otherwise prevent me from actually [completing the
project over the next 30 days/doing so over the next few
months].”4
3In Study 1, additionally, with the exception of participants who said
the probability of project completion was 100%, participants were asked
to give their best estimate of “how far along” they expected to be within
30 days in terms of project completion, again as a percentage, though we
do not analyze results of that variable here.
4Several additional questions were also included in Study 2, though
analyses of them are not reported here: one asking whether their inten-
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2.1.4 Attention manipulation
By random assignment, some participants made their self-
predictions before rating potential barriers (obstacles and
competing demands); other participants evaluated the po-
tential barriers before making their self-predictions. This
allows us to test whether drawing attention to potential
barriers, by the explicit request to evaluate them, influ-
ences self-predictions.
In Study 1, specifically, both self-predictions and inten-
tion strength ratings were elicited either before or after the
obstacle and competing demands ratings. Obstacles were
always rated before competing demands, while the order
in which the self-predictions and intention strength ratings
was counterbalanced within each condition. In Study 2,
the self-prediction item was either the first question asked
(before all other items, including intentions, obstacles, and
competing demands) or the very last (after all the other
items). The remaining items were presented in one of four
pseudo-random orders.
2.1.5 Follow-up measures
Participants were re-contacted either 30 days (Study 1, by
phone or email) or three months (Study 2, by phone) after
making their self-predictions. They were reminded of the
activity or project about which they had been interviewed,
and were asked whether they had in fact completed it.
Those who reported having completed the project/activity
were also asked when they had completed it; those who
reported not having completed the project/activity were
asked to indicate howmuch progress (expressed as percent
completed) had been made to date. The latter respondents
were also given the opportunity to briefly explain why the
project had not yet been completed. In the analyses re-
ported here we focus exclusively on the simple dichoto-
mous outcome variable indicating that the participant ei-
ther did or did not complete the project/activity within the
designated time period.
In Study 2, the interviewer also obtained several retro-
spective assessments corresponding to the prospective rat-
ings obtained during the initial survey (identical in word-
ing, except now written in the past tense), including the
impact of obstacles and competing demands. Each of the
ratings was made on the same 10-point scale as were the
corresponding measures at Time 1.5 Participants in Study
tions to carry out the nominated activity might change over time, another
asking whether similar activities in the past had usually taken longer to
complete than originally planned, another asking if there would be strong
encouragement or pressure from people in their life to complete the tar-
get activity, and a final question asking if they already had a clear plan or
knowledge of the steps they would need to take.
5Though results are not reported here, participants also attempted to
recall their probability estimate, given at Time 1, that the target activ-
ity would be completed in three months. They then reported whether,
looking back on the original prediction, it was either too optimistic, too
2 were also asked about their status on several demo-
graphic variables, including age, and the interviewer made
a subjective judgment regarding the respondent’s sex.
2.2 Results
Correlations among the key dependent variables are
shown in Table 1 for each study.
2.2.1 Self-predicted vs. actual behavior
In Study 1, customers leaving the hardware store ex-
pressed strong intentions (M = 9.36, SD = 1.72) and gave
high self-predicted probabilities (M = 91%, SD =20%)
of completing the project within 30 days. Indeed, nearly
two-thirds of the respondents (139 out of 211) stated that
the probability of completing the project within 30 days
was 100%. In the restricted dataset for which we have
the follow-up measures (N = 130), the mean self-predicted
probability of completing the target activity was 92%. If
the self-predictions were well-calibrated, then we would
expect to find that, upon being re-contacted 30 days later,
92% of the respondents would report having completed
the project. In fact, only 75% of respondents (98 out
of 130) reported having completed the project 30 days
later, reflecting a significant optimistic bias of 17 percent-
age points, t(129) = 4.71, p < .001. Even among the
87 respondents (for whom we have follow-up data) who
said the probability of project completion was 100%, only
74 (85%) reported having completed the project. While
the project completion rate was low relative to that ex-
pected from the self-predictions, in an absolute sense it
is quite high. Previous studies of optimistic bias in self-
predictions have generally examined target behaviors with
a lower probability of completion (e.g., in Koehler &
Poon, 2006, Study 1, the actual rate of the target behav-
ior — blood donation — was only 20%). It is notable that
we continue to see optimistic bias in self-predictions even
for high-probability target behaviors.
In Study 2, participants had not yet taken any initial
steps in completing their project or activity. Inspection
of the self-predictions (M = 67%, SD = 29%) and inten-
tion strength ratings (M = 7.85, SD = 2.36) show that, as
expected, the means were lower and there was greater vari-
ance in both these variables than was observed in Study 1.
For instance, in contrast to Study 1 in which two-thirds
of participants gave self-predictions of project completion
of 100%, only 15% (48 out of 314 respondents) did so
in Study 2. Self-predictions did not differ significantly
between household projects (M = 67%, SD = 29%) and
leisure activities (M = 66%, SD = 30%), nor did the rela-
tion between self-predictions and current intentions vary
pessimistic, or about right at the time that they made it.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 3, May 2014 Self-prediction and barriers to intended actions 213
Table 1: Descriptives and intercorrelations among dependent variables in Studies 1 and 2, among all participants from
whom we collected predictions, and among the subset from whom we were also able to obtain outcome (self-reported
behavior) data.
STUDY 1: Hardware Store
Predictions (N=211)
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3
1. intention rating 9.36 1.72
2. judged probability 90.92 19.63 .807∗∗
3. obstacles 3.39 2.81 −.147∗ −.238∗∗
4. competing demands 4.24 2.90 −.252∗∗ −.345∗∗ .567∗∗
Outcomes (N=130)
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1. intention rating 9.42 1.46
2. judged probability 92.04 17.23 .734∗∗
3. obstacles 3.27 2.81 −.320∗∗ −.343∗∗
4. competing demands 4.07 2.83 −.278∗∗ −.331∗∗ .556∗∗
5. behavior 0.75 0.43 .224∗ .359∗∗ −.210∗ −0.164
STUDY 2: Phone Survey
Predictions (N=314)
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3
1. intention rating 7.85 2.36
2. judged probability 66.60 29.42 .648∗∗
3. obstacles 5.88 3.02 −.253∗∗ −.306∗∗
4. competing demands 6.32 2.92 −.276∗∗ −.306∗∗ .627∗∗
Outcomes (N=266)
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1. intention rating 7.96 2.31
2. judged probability 66.98 29.17 .626∗∗
3. obstacles 5.82 2.99 −.265∗∗ −.332∗∗
4. competing demands 6.30 2.87 −.280∗∗ −.321∗∗ .621∗∗
5. behavior 0.31 0.46 .217∗∗ .290∗∗ −.130∗ −.173∗∗
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, 2-tailed.
by project type (interaction B = −0.29, SEB = 1.09, p =
.793). Evidently, respondents relied to the same extent
on their current intentions when predicting their likelihood
of completing either an obligatory household project or a
more discretionary leisure activity.
In the restricted dataset for which we have the follow-
up measures (N = 266), the mean self-predicted proba-
bility of completing the target activity was 67%. If the
self-predictions are not systematically biased, then, we
would expect to find that, upon follow-up, 67% of respon-
dents report having completed the activity. In fact, only
31% (82 of 266) reported having completed the activity
when they were re-contacted three months after making
their predictions. The much lower completion rate in this
study, compared to Study 1 (75%), was anticipated due
to the differences between studies in forecast horizon and
status of the project or activity at the time the study was
conducted. The difference between the self-predicted and
actual probability of completing the target activity again
reveals a large optimistic bias, t(265) = 12.5, p < .001.
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In Study 2 (but not Study 1) we also collected data on
participants’ sex and age. Males and females did not dif-
fer in their self-predictions, intention strength, or likeli-
hood of completing the target activity, nor did they differ
in the weight placed on intention strength when making
their self-predictions. Likewise, age (as measured in 10-
year increments) did not correlate with self-predictions,
intention strength, or likelihood of completing the target
activity. There was also no relation between age and the
weight placed on current intentions when making self-
predictions. The older did not appear to be wiser in
terms of being less prone to optimistic bias in their self-
predictions: Participants who were 40 and older overesti-
mated their likelihood of completing the target activity by
an average of 38 percentage points; those under 40 over-
estimated by 33 percentage points.
2.2.2 Tests of H1: Inattention to Potential Barriers
Did calling attention to potential barriers, by first eliciting
ratings of anticipated obstacles and competing demands,
lead to lower self-predictions (or less optimistic bias) than
when such factors were not considered prior to making the
self-predictions? There was no evidence of this in either
study. Self-predictions were no lower when elicited af-
ter the potential barrier ratings (Study 1: M = 89%, SD =
20%; Study 2: M = 69%, SD = 27%) than they were before
(Study 1: M = 92%; SD = 20%; Study 2: M = 64%, SD
= 32%), contrary to H1, t(209) = 1.04, p = .299 for Study
1 and t(312) = 1.45, p = .148 for Study 2; nearly identical
results are obtained when only the subset of participants
for whom we have follow-up data is examined. Like-
wise, optimistic bias (self-predicted minus actual proba-
bility of project completion, calculated for participants for
whom we have follow-up data) was not significantly lower
among those who first evaluated potential barriers (Study
1: M = 14%, SD = 36%; Study 2: M = 36%, SD = 48%)
than among those who did not (Study 1: M = 19%, SD =
44%; Study 2: M = 36%, SD = 46%), t(128) = 0.76, p =
.450 for Study 1, and t(264) = 0.02, p = .984 for Study 2.
Self-predictions did not ignore potential barriers al-
together. A regression of self-predictions on intention
strength and anticipated barriers (using a composite of the
obstacles and competing demands items) showed that bar-
riers remained a significant predictor in both studies even
when controlling for current intentions (Table 2). (The
composite barrier measure, on its own, was in fact signifi-
cantly correlated with actual project completion; r =−.21,
p = .015 in Study 1 and r =−.17, p = .007 in Study 2.) Ta-
ble 2 also shows regressions in which potential obstacles
and competing demands were entered as separate terms
(rather than as a composite), and indicates that competing
demands (in Study 1) and potential obstacles (in Study 2)
accounted for significant variance in self-predictions even
when intention strength was included in the model. A
possible interpretation of these analyses, taken together, is
that participants considered potential barriers in their self-
predictions — at least to some extent — whether or not
those barriers had been drawn explicitly to their attention.
2.2.3 Test of H2: Discounting of potential barriers
If the anticipated impact of potential barriers was dis-
counted at the time self-predictions were elicited, then we
would expect to see the retrospective ratings (elicited in
Study 2 only) to acknowledge a greater impact of barri-
ers on activity completion than had originally been antic-
ipated. In fact, contrary to H2, the retrospective ratings
of the impact of obstacles (M = 6.0, SD = 3.6) and com-
peting demands (M = 6.5, SD = 3.4) were not significantly
higher than the prospective ratings (obstacles: M = 5.8, SD
= 3.0; competing demands: M = 6.3, SD = 2.9), t(260) =
0.89, p = .377 for obstacles and t(260) = 1.06, p = .259 for
competing demands. Prospective and retrospective ratings
were significantly positively correlated both for obstacles
(r = .225) and for competing demands (r = .351). Partici-
pants in Study 2 appeared to have at least a limited ability
to anticipate the likelihood that they would encounter ob-
stacles or competing demands, and did not appear, in the
direct ratings made prospectively, to systematically under-
estimate their future impact.
2.2.4 Predictive model testing H1 and H2
If potential barriers are not given sufficient weight in self-
predictions, as implied by H1 and H2, then adding the
anticipated barrier ratings to a regression model should
improve its ability to predict project or activity outcomes
(i.e., behavior) relative to a baseline model that uses only
the self-predictions themselves as a predictor. We com-
pared a full logistic regression model predicting project
completion from self-predictions, ratings of potential ob-
stacles, and ratings of competing demands, to a reduced
model using only the self-predictions as a predictor (Ta-
ble 2). In the full model, neither potential obstacles nor
competing demands emerged as significant predictors in
either study, and the full model that included these poten-
tial barriers did not significantly outperform the reduced
model that excluded them, χ2(2) = 1.011, p = .603 in
Study 1, and χ2(2) = 1.33, p =.514 in Study 2.6 Self-
predictions, apparently, could not be improved, in terms
of more accurately distinguishing cases in which the tar-
get project/activity would or would not be completed, by
a model that placed more appropriate weight on potential
6Adding intention strength at the second step, rather than the two
barrier ratings, likewise did not significantly improve the fit of the model,
χ
2(1) = 0.627, p = .429 in Study 1, and χ2(1) = 0.518, p =.472 in Study
2.
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Table 2: Regression Analyses from Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1: Hardware Store
DV = self-prediction B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 12.956 4.824 2.686 0.008
intention strength 8.817 0.464 0.772 19.018 <.001
barriers composite −1.205 0.315 −0.155 −3.822 <.001
R2 = .675
2 (Constant) 13.466 4.886 2.756 0.006
intention strength 8.78 0.467 0.769 18.791 <.001
obstacles −0.398 0.336 −0.057 −1.186 0.237
competing demands −0.805 0.333 −0.119 −2.418 0.016
R2 = .675
DV = intention strength B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 2.701 0.402 6.721 <.001
self-prediction 0.072 0.004 0.822 19.018 <.001
barriers composite 0.03 0.029 0.045 1.036 0.301
R2 = .654
2 (Constant) 2.73 0.408 6.694 <.001
self-prediction 0.072 0.004 0.82 18.791 <.001
obstacles 0.027 0.03 0.045 0.895 0.372
competing demands 0.003 0.031 0.005 0.105 0.917
R2 = .654
DV = behavior B SE(B) Wald df Sig.
1 intention strength 0.303 0.129 5.54 1 0.019
Constant −1.698 1.208 1.975 1 0.16
−2 log likelihood = 139.4; χ2(1) = 5.687
2 self-prediction 0.047 0.015 10.252 1 0.001
Constant −3.142 1.358 5.353 1 0.021
−2 log likelihood = 130.2; χ2(1) = 14.889
3 obstacles −0.13 0.084 2.434 1 0.119
competing demands −0.06 0.088 0.465 1 0.495
Constant 1.844 0.406 20.638 1 <.001
−2 log likelihood = 139.2; χ2(2) = 5.911
4 self-prediction 0.041 0.015 7.128 1 0.008
obstacles −0.079 0.095 0.706 1 0.401
competing demands −0.003 0.099 0.001 1 0.978
Constant −2.28 1.588 2.061 1 0.151
−2 log likelihood = 129.2; χ2(3) = 15.90
DV = optimism (self-prediction – behavior) B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) −0.023 0.232 −0.1 0.92
intention strength 0.02 0.024 0.073 0.828 0.409
R2 = .005
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Study 2: Phone Survey
DV = self-prediction B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 18.177 6.058 3 0.003
intention strength 7.511 0.552 0.602 13.605 <.001
barriers composite −1.73 0.487 −0.157 −3.554 <.001
R2 = .443
2 (Constant) 19.039 5.984 3.181 0.002
intention strength 7.463 0.543 0.607 13.734 <.001
obstacles −1.136 0.523 −0.118 −2.171 0.031
competing demands −0.639 0.546 −0.064 −1.169 0.243
R2 = .454
DV = intention strength B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 5.008 0.411 12.176 <.001
self-prediction 0.05 0.004 0.62 13.605 <.001
barriers composite −0.076 0.04 −0.086 −1.894 0.059
R2 = .653
2 (Constant) 4.877 0.419 11.638 <.001
self-prediction 0.051 0.004 0.628 13.734 <.001
obstacles −0.006 0.044 −0.007 −0.13 0.897
competing demands −0.064 0.045 −0.079 −1.418 0.157
R2 = .659
DV = behavior B SE(B) Wald df Sig.
1 intention strength 0.248 0.072 11.75 1 0.001
Constant −2.846 0.628 20.517 1 0
−2 log likelihood = 314.5; χ2(1) = 14.088
2 self-prediction 0.03 0.006 21.253 1 <.001
Constant −2.987 0.518 33.208 1 <.001
−2 log likelihood = 294.5; χ2(1) = 27.971
3 obstacles −0.027 0.057 0.226 1 0.634
competing demands −0.114 0.059 3.724 1 0.054
Constant 0.03 0.326 0.008 1 0.928
−2 log likelihood = 314.2; χ2(2) = 8.19
4 self-prediction 0.028 0.007 16.457 1 <.001
obstacles 0.023 0.061 0.149 1 0.699
competing demands −0.07 0.062 1.253 1 0.263
Constant −2.541 0.73 12.104 1 0.001
−2 log likelihood = 293.1; χ2(3) = 29.301
DV = optimism (self-prediction – behavior) B SE(B) Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 0.079 0.102 0.776 0.439
intention strength 0.035 0.012 0.174 2.876 0.004
R2 = .030
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Figure 1: Regression curves showing self-predicted and
actual probability of project completion as a function of
intention strength, in Study 1 (Hardware Store).
barriers as rated at the time of prediction, contrary to what
would be expected under H1 or H2.
This result is not attributable to the anticipated barrier
ratings being completely non-predictive of future behav-
ior on their own. A regression model with the two bar-
rier items (potential obstacles and competing demands)
entered on the first step accounted for a marginally sig-
nificant portion of variance in behavior in Study 1, χ2(2)
= 5.91, p =.052, and for significant portion of variance in
Study 2, χ2(2) = 8.19, p =.017. (In both studies, adding
self-predictions in the second step accounted for signifi-
cant additional variance in behavior, χ2(1) = 9.989, p =
.002 in Study 1, and χ2(1) = 21.11, p < .001 in Study 2.)
2.2.5 Tests of H3: Overweighting of current inten-
tions
Did self-predictions place too much weight on current in-
tentions? Figures 1 and 2 compare, in Studies 1 and 2
respectively, regression lines of self-predictions and of ac-
tual project/activity completion on intention strength as
rated at the time of prediction. Logistic regressions of
project/activity completion (dashed lines) on intention rat-
ings show that, in both studies, the probability of project
completion did increase with strength of intentions as
elicited at the time of self-prediction (Table 2). In other
words, current intention strength is indeed a valid cue in
predicting subsequent likelihood of project completion.
The self-predictions, however, appeared to place too much
weight on current intentions, in that the probability of
Figure 2: Regression curves showing self-predicted and
actual probability of activity completion as a function of
intention strength, in Study 2 (Phone Survey).
project completion does not increase as sharply with in-
creases in intention strength as the self-predictions would
imply. This discrepancy is apparent in the comparison, in
Figures 1 and 2, of the regression curves for self-predicted
(solid lines) and actual probability of project completion
(dashed lines) as a function of intention strength: The for-
mer is steeper than the latter.
One means of testing the discrepancy in slopes is to
take the difference, for each participant, between the self-
predicted (a continuous variable) and actual (a binary vari-
able) probability of completing the target activity, which
can be thought of as a measure of optimistic bias, and to
regress it on intention strength. Table 2 shows the results.
In Study 2, optimistic bias increased significantly with in-
creasing intention strength. That is, self-predictions in-
creased significantly more steeply with intention strength
than did the actual probability of the target activity, con-
sistent with H3.
In Study 1, the relation between optimistic bias and
intention strength was not statistically significant. Some
caution is required in interpreting this result and the as-
sociated Figure 1, however, due to the restricted range
over which intention strength varied in the sample: Nearly
80% of respondents for whom we have follow-up data
had given the maximum possible intention strength rat-
ing of 10 at the time of self-prediction. Despite this con-
cern, we attempted to find evidence for H3 by compar-
ing mean self-predicted and actual probabilities of project
completion between those participants giving the maxi-
mum intention strength rating of 10 (n = 103) and those
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giving an intention strength rating of less than 10 (n =
27). Self-predicted probabilities were significantly higher
for the former group (M = 97%) than for the latter (M =
73%), t(128) = 8.06, p < .001, but the difference in the
actual probability of completing the project between the
two groups (M = 79% and 63%, respectively) was smaller
and not statistically significant, t(128) = 1.69, p = .094.
The group with the stronger intentions overestimated their
probability of completing the project by 18 percentage
points while the group with less strong intentions did so by
only 10 percentage points. That said, clearly the evidence
supporting H3 is less strong in Study 1 than in Study 2.
Finally, we also tested whether the manipulation draw-
ing attention to potential barriers had any effect on the
weight placed on current intentions in the self-prediction
process. When self-predictions are regressed on inten-
tion strength and the attention manipulation (whether self-
predictions were made before or after evaluating potential
barriers), such an effect would appear as an interaction be-
tween the two factors. Results indicated no such interac-
tion (Study 1: B = 0.498, SEB = 0.936, p = .596; Study
2: B = −1.82, SEB = 1.11, p = .101). These analyses
used the entire dataset, including participants for whom
no follow-up data were collected, for maximum statis-
tical power; qualitatively similar conclusions hold when
the analyses are restricted to the subset of participants
for whom follow-up data were available. The intention
strength ratings themselves were not affected by the atten-
tion manipulation, either, t(209) = 0.47, p =.64 in Study 1,
and t(312) = 1.39, p =.17 in Study 2.
3 Study 3: Blood donation
Studies 1 and 2 revealed an optimistic bias in self-
predictions, consistent with previous research. Neither
study provided evidence that people fail to attend to, or
systematically discount, potential barriers when making
self-predictions, contrary to H1 (Inattention to Potential
Barriers) and H2 (Discounting of Potential Barriers). It
appears that potential barriers, at least to the extent that
their impact can be accurately anticipated, are adequately
factored into self-predictions.
The modest correlations between prospective and ret-
rospective estimates of the impact of such barriers ob-
served in Study 2, however, suggest that many of the bar-
riers people encounter in attempting to complete intended
actions are unpredictable. More generally, the processes
by which current intentions are translated into future be-
havior are typically unreliable, meaning that current in-
tentions will be an imperfect predictor of future behavior,
and should be weighted accordingly. Studies 1 and 2 indi-
cated that current intentions received too much weight in
self-predictions, which tends to produce overly optimistic
self-predictions in the presence of strong intentions.
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) suggested that intuitive
predictions are often as extreme as the cues on which the
predictions are based, even when the individual making
the prediction freely acknowledges, when asked directly,
that the cues are imperfectly correlated with the outcome
variable being predicted. The logic of statistical predic-
tion, of course, requires that predictions place less weight
on a predictive cue as the correlation between the cue and
the outcome variable decreases. To the extent that intu-
itive self-predictions do not respect this normative statisti-
cal principle, however, it is possible that people could si-
multaneously acknowledge the presence of situational fac-
tors (e.g., unpredictable barriers; i.e., barriers whose pres-
ence and impact is uncertain) that attenuate the correlation
between current intentions and future behavior, and at the
same time fail to appropriately adjust the weight placed on
their current intentions when making self-predictions.
We tested this possibility in Study 3 using a manipu-
lation that was designed to increase acknowledgement, at
least in direct ratings, of the possible impact of various sit-
uational factors on the likelihood of completing the target
behavior. The key question is whether the manipulation,
assuming it is effective, leads people to change their self-
predictions, for instance by placing less weight on their
current intentions when predicting their future behavior.
We hypothesized, following H3 (Overweighting of current
intentions), that it would not. Demonstration of a disso-
ciation between self-predictions and direct ratings of the
potential impact of situation factors (e.g., barriers) would
provide stronger evidence for H3 than was provided by the
null effect of the attentional manipulation in Studies 1 and
2.
We chose to concentrate on a single target behavior,
blood donation, as the focus of self-predictions to mini-
mize variance in the nature and magnitude of the behav-
ior being predicted, and — because people vary widely
in their intentions to donate blood — to examine the rela-
tion between self-predictions and intention strength over
a broader range of intention strength than in the previous
two studies involving self-nominated target behaviors.
Past research (e.g., Koehler & Poon, 2006) suggests that
blood donation is, for many people, something they intend
to do but are not always successful in actually doing. We
generated a list of situational factors, based on this previ-
ous research, that could influence the likelihood that inten-
tions to donate blood are translated into actual donations.
Some participants were asked to evaluate the potential im-
pact of each in an “unpacked” list of situational factors
that could make it easier or more difficult to donate blood,
prior to giving self-predictions and ratings of current in-
tentions with respect to blood donation. We chose to list
potential facilitating situational factors as well as potential
barriers, both to reduce experimental demand and to high-
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light the inherent uncertainty of predicting future behavior
from current intentions in light of the various situational
factors that could influence blood donation behavior either
positively or negatively. It is worth noting, however, that
many of the potentially facilitating factors included in the
unpacked list would not necessarily apply to the circum-
stances of the participant, and hence their possible absence
could be viewed effectively as a potential barrier.
Other participants did not evaluate the unpacked list of
specific situational factors, but did rate the possible im-
pact of this overall (“packed”) category of factors on their
likelihood of donating blood before making their self-
predictions. The influence of considering situational fac-
tors, in either packed or unpacked form, was evaluated
relative to a control group that did not rate the potential
impact of the situational factors until after making their
self-predictions. We expected that being presented with an
unpacked list of specific situational factors would lead to
greater agreement, compared to those who did not see the
unpacked list, that such factors could influence the like-
lihood of donating blood (see Tversky & Koehler, 1994).
Our main question, assuming the manipulation had this
effect, was how it would affect self-predictions and the
weight they placed on current intentions.
Because our key question concerned factors influencing
self-predictions, and not the correspondence between self-
predictions and actual behavior, in this study we elicited
self-predictions but did not attempt to collect follow-up
data on rates of actual blood donation.
3.1 Method
Participants were undergraduates at the University of Wa-
terloo who completed an online questionnaire in exchange
for extra credit in their introductory psychology course.
The questionnaire concerned the likelihood that the partic-
ipants would donate blood at least once between the date
the questionnaire was administered and the end of the cal-
endar year, which was approximately 8 months in the fu-
ture. An initial item was used to screen out participants
who were ineligible to donate blood in that timeframe for
medical or other reasons. All remaining participants were
asked to rate the strength of their current intentions to do-
nate blood on a 9-point scale (“Right now, as I think about
it, I strongly intend to donate blood by the end of [the cur-
rent calendar year]” where 1 = “strongly disagree” and 9 =
“strongly agree”), and to estimate the probability that they
would actually do so on a 0% to 100% probability scale
presented in 5% increments.7
7Participants were also asked to judge, as a percentile, where their in-
tention strength ratings and self-predictions placed them relative to other
students completing the questionnaire, but we do not report those results
here.
Participants were also asked, either before or after giv-
ing their intention ratings and self-predictions, to evalu-
ate situational factors that might influence their likelihood
of donating blood by the end of the calendar year. The
situational factors were divided into two types, those that
might prevent the participant from donating blood (“pre-
ventative factors”) and those that could help enable the
participant to donate blood (“enabling factors”). All par-
ticipants rated their agreement (on a 9-point scale) with a
pair of general statements, one regarding preventative and
the other enabling factors, that such factors could influ-
ence their likelihood of donating blood: “Overall, I might
be influenced by factors that [prevent me from donating
blood]/ [help enable me to donate blood].” Before rating
their agreement with either general statement, participants
in the “unpacked” condition first rated (on the same re-
sponse scale) the possible impact of each in a list of 8
specific situational factors of that type (preventative or en-
abling; see Appendix). For example, specific preventative
factors included not hearing about an on-campus donation
event, forgetting such an event, being too busy, and the lo-
cation for donation being inconvenient for the participant.
Specific enabling factors included receiving a reminder of
a blood donation event, signing up in advance for such
an event, donating with a group of friends, and seeing
a heart-warming advertisement encouraging blood dona-
tion. Participants in the “packed” condition were not pre-
sented with the unpacked lists of specific factors and only
evaluated their agreement with the pair of general state-
ments regarding the two broad categories of situational
factors.8
A final section of the questionnaire, not discussed fur-
ther here, asked participants whether they had ever do-
nated blood before, whether they had donated in the past
year; they were also asked to estimate the percentage
of fellow students completing the questionnaire who had
done so, as well as the percentage that would donate by
the end of the calendar year.
8There was another experimental manipulation that was less directly
relevant to the key question addressed by Study 3. Some participants
were asked to rate their agreement with a set of 7 favorable and unobjec-
tionable attitude statements regarding the societal benefits of blood do-
nation, before going on to complete the main study as described above.
Other participants only rated their agreement with the attitude statements
after completing the main study. This manipulation was designed to
strengthen current intentions to donate blood, and indeed exerted its ex-
pected effects on both intention strength ratings and self-predictions. The
manipulation did not interact with the other experimental variables that
are our main focus here in their effects on either intention strength ratings
or self-predictions; the manipulation also did not influence the weight
placed on intention strength in the self-predictions, so this variable is not
considered further in the analyses reported here.
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3.2 Results
Of the 399 respondents who started to complete the online
questionnaire, 112 (or 28.1%) indicated that they would
be unable to donate blood before the end of the calen-
dar year for medical or other reasons. Of the remaining
287 participants, 21 (or 7.3%) were excluded because they
did not complete one or more of our key dependent mea-
sures (self-prediction, intention strength, global preventa-
tive and enabling factor ratings), leaving 266 respondents
in the final sample.
Ratings of the unpacked preventative factors indicated
moderate levels of agreement that they could have some
impact, with means ranging from approximately 4 to 5.5
on the 9-point agreement scale. Participants in the un-
packed condition went on to express greater agreement
(M = 5.43, SD = 2.40, n = 129) with the global statement
about preventative factors (“Overall, I might be influenced
by factors that prevent me from donating blood”) than did
those in the “packed” condition (M = 4.69, SD = 2.36, n
= 137), t(264) = 2.56, p = .011. Likewise, ratings of the
unpacked enabling factors indicated moderate agreement
that they could have some impact, with means ranging
from approximately 5 to 6.5. Agreement with the global
statement about enabling factors (“Overall, I might be in-
fluenced by factors that help enable me to donate blood”)
was also higher in the unpacked condition (M = 5.55, SD =
2.31) than in the packed condition (M = 5.06, SD = 2.26),
though in this case the difference was only marginally sta-
tistically significant, t(264) = 1.76, p = .08 (or p = .04 by a
one-tailed test).
We now turn to the question of whether considering
preventative and enabling factors, in packed or unpacked
form, prior to making self-predictions had any effect ei-
ther on the self-predictions (as a main effect) or on the
weight placed on intention strength when making the
self-predictions. ANOVA of the self-predictions showed
no main effects of either the unpacking manipulation,
the order variable (whether the enabling and preventa-
tive factors were considered before or after making the
self-predictions), or an interaction between the two vari-
ables. Analysis of the intention strength measure likewise
showed no effects of these variables.
To test whether considering the preventative and en-
abling factors influenced the weight subsequently placed
on intention strength when making self-predictions, self-
predictions were regressed on intention strength, the or-
der variable (whether the enabling and preventative fac-
tors were considered before or after making the self-
predictions, coded 0 and 1, respectively), and their interac-
tion (Table 3). The interaction was not statistically signifi-
cant (B =−0.87, SEB = 0.81, p = .284), indicating that par-
ticipants did not place less weight on their current inten-
tions when estimating their probability of donating blood
Figure 3: Regression lines showing self-predicted proba-
bility of blood donation as a function of intention strength,
separately for those who made their self-predictions first
(i.e., before the ratings of enabling and preventative fac-
tors) and for those who made self-prediction after rating
the enabling and preventative factors in either packed or
unpacked form, in Study 3 (Blood Donation).
after considering and acknowledging that there were vari-
ous situational factors that could influence their likelihood
of successfully translating their intentions into action.
As in the previous studies, the self-predictions closely
followed ratings of current intention strength (B = 11.1,
SEB = 0.57, p < .001). As a sharper test, the regression
analysis was repeated with just the subset of participants
assigned to the unpacked condition (Table 3), but again
there was no evidence that current intentions were given
less weight following consideration of the unpacked lists
of factors that could influence the likelihood of blood do-
nation (B = −1.13, SEB = 1.26, p = .372). The regression
lines in Figure 3 show self-predictions as a function of in-
tention strength separately for participants who made them
before considering the enabling and preventative factors,
or after evaluating the enabling and preventative factors in
either packed or unpacked form. The near-identical slopes
across conditions indicate that drawing attention to these
situational factors, even in unpacked form, did not lower
the weight placed by self-predictions on current intentions.
4 General discussion
A plausible explanation for optimistic bias in self-
predictions is that people do not adjust their predictions
sufficiently in light of information they have, or can gen-
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 3, May 2014 Self-prediction and barriers to intended actions 221
Table 3: Study 3 regression analysis results. The dependent variable is self-prediction.
Both packing conditions
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) −16.157 7.279 −2.22 0.027
intention strength 11.121 0.572 0.886 19.436 0
order 2.642 4.654 0.039 0.568 0.571
intention x order −0.872 0.812 −0.083 −1.074 0.284
R2 = .726
Unpacked condition only
(Constant) −19.177 11.176 −1.716 0.089
intention strength 10.67 0.844 0.863 12.649 0
order 7.02 7.383 0.108 0.951 0.344
intention x order −1.127 1.259 −0.111 −0.895 0.372
R2 = .680
erate, regarding situational barriers that will predictably
affect their probability of completing the target activity.
This account is compatible with previous research empha-
sizing the role of plans and intentions in the self-prediction
process (e.g., Buehler, Griffin, & Peetz, 2010; Helzer
& Dunning, 2012; Koehler & Poon, 2006; Koehler et
al., 2011; Peetz & Buehler, 2009). It suggests that self-
predictions would be improved if greater attention was
paid to, and greater weight placed on, situational barri-
ers that can interfere with the completion of planned or
intended action. Studies 1 and 2, however, failed to pro-
vide evidence for this claim. Although self-predictions
tended to be too optimistic, a manipulation designed to
draw attention to potential barriers had no reliable effect
on subsequent self-predictions. This result did not ap-
pear to come about because self-predictions entirely ig-
nored potential barriers. In fact, the results of Studies 1
and 2 implied that adequate upward or downward adjust-
ments were made for any barriers that were predictable at
the time the self-prediction was elicited; at least, statistical
models that optimally weighted prospective ratings of po-
tential barriers were unable to systematically outperform
the self-predictions themselves in terms of predictive (cor-
relational) accuracy.
Studies 1 and 2 suggested that the observed optimistic
bias in self-predictions stemmedmore from overweighting
of current intentions than it did from underweighting of
predictable barriers to completing the target activity. We
favor the interpretation that much of the challenge in self-
prediction of future behavior lies in the unpredictable im-
pact of the situational factors that are encountered on the
path from intention formation to completion of the target
activity. In light of the unreliability with which current
intentions are translated into future behavior, intention
strength ought to receive appropriately moderated weight
in self-predictions. The evidence from Studies 1 and 2 is
consistent with the claim that self-predictions overweight
current intentions. This finding is illustrated in Figures
1 and 2, which show how optimistic bias increases with
strength of intentions at the time of self-prediction.
The null result of Studies 1 and 2, that drawing attention
to potential obstacles did not influence self-predictions,
might be attributable to an ineffective manipulation. In
Study 3, however, a different manipulation (unpacking)
was used to draw attention to situational factors (such as
potential barriers) that could affect the likelihood of the
target behavior, and it was found to influence direct rat-
ings of the potential impact of these factors. Despite the
evidence that the manipulation was effective in increas-
ing acknowledgement of the possible impact of these sit-
uational factors, however, self-predictions remained unaf-
fected: The manipulation did not lead to generally lower
self-predicted probabilities of donating blood nor to less
weight being placed on current intentions when making
the self-predictions.
In sum, we find that the general principle of predic-
tion by evaluation (Kahneman and Tversky,1973), suffi-
ciently accounted for the optimistic bias in self-predictions
observed in the studies reported here. This account is
helpful in identifying the circumstances under which self-
predictions are likely to be most overly optimistic, namely
when current intentions are strong but their translatability
into future behavior is unreliable (Koehler & Poon, 2006).
It is notable that, in our studies at least, it was not nec-
essary to invoke motivated reasoning processes to explain
the optimistic bias we observed in self-predictions across
a range of target behaviors.
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Our findings may appear to contradict previous work
that traces error in self-prediction to a neglect of situa-
tional barriers or obstacles (Balcetis & Dunning, 2008,
2013; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Newby-Clark et
al., 2000). For instance, people are less likely to account
for potential obstacles and interruptions when predicting
the completion time of their own future tasks than oth-
ers’ tasks (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Newby-Clark
et al., 2000), and drawing explicit attention to these fac-
tors can reduce optimistic bias (Peetz, Buehler, & Wilson,
2010). Similarly, people fail to anticipate the influence of
situational barriers (e.g., the presence of onlookers, a bad
mood) when predicting the likelihood that they will en-
gage in helping behaviors (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013). In
contrast, we found that people incorporated potential bar-
riers into their predictions whether attention was drawn to
them or not, and did so about as well as possible. It is
noteworthy, however, that the barriers we examined can
be seen as a small subcategory of all the possible barriers
to intended behavior. These barriers, as operationalized in
our measures, represent the set of factors that people are
able to identify at the time of prediction as (potentially)
influencing their own behavior. Although these recog-
nizable barriers were incorporated into predictions, there
were surely many other situational factors that influenced
behavior in ways that people failed to anticipate. Thus
our findings do not suggest that people accurately adjust
for all situational factors, but rather that the barriers they
can identify as relevant to their own future behavior, when
asked explicitly to do so, are incorporated adequately into
self-predictions. Remarkably, despite adjusting for these
recognizable barriers, people do not adequately attenuate
the weight placed on their current intentions when predict-
ing their future behavior.
An alternative to the claim that self-predictions place
excessive weight on current intentions is that perhaps our
participants simply fail to distinguish the two concepts,
yielding high correlations between them. In our studies,
we deliberately juxtaposed the two measures, within sub-
jects, to emphasize (e.g., through conversational norms;
Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1994) that they were meant to
measure or reflect two different things. The intention
strength measure highlighted the individual’s current feel-
ings (“right now, as I think about it”) or desire to carry
out the target behavior; the self-prediction by contrast fo-
cused on the future state of affairs in which the target be-
havior either would or would not be carried out, and em-
phasized realistic estimation over current feelings (“how
likely is it that you will actually [carry out the target be-
havior]”). Nonetheless, we do not have direct control over
how participants interpreted the two questions, leaving
open the possibility that for whatever reason they took the
two questions to be largely synonymous.
Examination of the data from Studies 1 and 2, how-
ever, does offer some evidence against this interpretation.
Consistent with the idea that, in contrast to the intention
strength measure, the self-predictions were supposed to
represent an accurate assessment of the probability that
the target behavior would be carried out, in both Studies 1
and 2 the self-predictions correlated more highly with sub-
sequent behavior than did the intention strength ratings:
In Study 1, self-predictions correlated .359 and intention
strength only .224 with subsequent behavior, Steiger’s Z
= 2.19, one-tailed p = .014, for the difference; in Study
2, self-predictions correlated .290 and intention strength
.217 with subsequent behavior, Z = 1.42, one-tailed p =
.078. Further, in a regression of project/activity comple-
tion on self-prediction and intention strength rating (en-
tered simultaneously), in both studies the self-prediction
term was statistically significant (B = .059, SEB = .022, p
= .008 in Study 1; B = .024, SEB = .008, p = .002 in Study
2) and the intention strength term was not (B = −0.186,
SEB = .246, p = .449 in Study 1; B = .068, SEB = .094, p
= .471 in Study 2).
Furthermore, there was some evidence that self-
predictions were more closely related to anticipated bar-
riers than were the intention ratings (see Table 2). Self-
predictions were related to ratings of potential obstacles in
Study 1, and to ratings of competing demands in Study 2,
even after controlling for intention strength. By contrast,
ratings of potential obstacles and of competing demands
were unrelated to the intention strength ratings when con-
trolling for self-predictions. Results were similar when the
composite barriers measure was used (instead of separate
measures of obstacles and competing demands), though it
should be acknowledged that the barriers composite term
was marginally significant in Study 2.
In sum, people evidently can make the distinction be-
tween what they currently intend to do in the future and
what they predict they will actually do (see also Gordon,
1990; Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Warshaw & Davis, 1985).
Typically the two evaluations coincide quite closely, how-
ever, because current intentions are so heavily weighted in
self-predictions. This is the case even when the individ-
ual is willing to acknowledge the presence of situational
barriers that introduce unreliability in the translation from
intentions to behavior and therefore normatively call for
decreased weight to be placed on intentions in the self-
prediction process.
Although we examined predictions across a wide range
of target behaviors, and demographically diverse samples,
there are likely to be factors that moderate the weight
placed by self-predictions on current intentions, including
the controllability and desirability of the predicted actions.
Our account may pertain primarily to behaviors that are
controllable, as people may be most inclined to base self-
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predictions on their current intentions to the extent that the
behaviors are seen as largely under their personal control.
Additionally, the role of intention in prediction may be
moderated by other characteristics of the target behavior
such as its importance and desirability. Finally although
we did not find effects of the sex or age of participants,
there may be individual differences (e.g., self efficacy, self
control, dispositional optimism) that could moderate how
intentions relate to both predicted and actual behaviors.
The cost of overweighting current intentions when mak-
ing self-predictions can be high when it produces overly
optimistic expectations for future goal-congruent behav-
ior. A credit card holder who is overly optimistic about
paying the monthly bill in full may not pay sufficient at-
tention to the card’s interest rate, for example; or a worka-
holic may make a non-refundable deposit on a vacation he
or she will never get around to taking. Interventions that
help people place more appropriate weight on their cur-
rent intentions when predicting their future behavior could
have the benefit of improving decisions with outcomes that
are contingent on their later actions.
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Appendix: Situational factors from
Study 3 (Blood donation).
Participants in the unpacked condition read and rated
their agreement with all nine statements on each list; par-
ticipants in the packed condition read and rated their
agreement only with the final statement in each list. Rat-
ings were made on a scale from 1 = “strongly disagree”
to 9 = “strongly agree.”
Factors that might prevent you from donating blood:
I might not hear about a blood donation clinic being held
on campus or elsewhere.
I might forget about a blood donation clinic that I had
heard was being held on campus or elsewhere.
My intention to donate blood might change.
I might be too busy to donate blood.
I might wait until too late to sign up to participate in a
blood donation clinic.
I might be ineligible due to illness or other factors be-
yond my control.
The location of the blood donation clinic might be in-
convenient.
I might be too afraid of needles to donate blood.
Overall, I might be influenced by factors that prevent
me from donating blood.
Factors that might help enable you donate blood:
Using a reminder (e.g., arranging a phone reminder, reg-
ularly checking the UW Bulletin, local newspaper) of an
upcoming blood donation clinic might help.
Going to the blood donor clinic with a group of friends
might help.
Signing up in advance to donate blood at a clinic might
help.
Learning about the eligibility rules for donating blood
might help.
Seeing a heart-warming advertisement encouraging
blood donation might help.
Learning about the scheduling/booking arrangements
for an upcoming clinic might help.
Being able to sign up to donate blood over the internet
might help.
Being able to “walk in” and donate blood without an
appointment might help.
Overall, I might be influenced by factors that help en-
able me to donate blood.
